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ABSTRACT
Purpose  When organisations behave irresponsibly, a question
remains: Can they use a messaging strategy based in the organisation’s
commitment social responsibility to effectively respond to the crisis? The
purpose of this chapter is to analyse stakeholder attitudes and their ante-
cedents in such a case. Because of its scope, magnitude and use of a
response strategy based on messages of social responsibility, the 2010
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BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico serves as an excellent case for measur-
ing the effectiveness of such a messaging strategy.
Methodology/approach  The present study drew from two data
sources: a content analysis of interactions on BP’s Facebook page
(N=1,515) as well as an image survey of BP (N=749).
Findings  BP’s messaging strategy had limited positive effects in terms
of (1) being viewed as a ‘socially responsible’ organisation and (2) cre-
ating significant good will towards the company. However, these data
also reveal that BP has effectively opened lines of communication
between stakeholders and the company.
Practical and social implications  This study has two central implica-
tions. First, for both organisations and activists, personal investment and
the relevance of issues are both critical in order to change stakeholder
attitudes about organisations. Second, based on this research, we can
begin to develop stakeholder profiles based on age, sex and political
identity.
Originality/value  In the last couple of years, considerable attention
has been paid to describing and analysing the response strategies that
organisations deploy; however, scant attention has been paid to measur-
ing stakeholder evaluations of those crisis response strategies.
Keywords: Research chapter; BP; crisis communication; stakeholder
evaluation; social construction
Media and industry evaluations of BP’s response to the 2010 spill in the
Gulf of Mexico have been largely negative (e.g. Bell, 2012; Shogren, 2011;
Warner, 2010; Webb, 2010). Two years after the spill, the company’s
stocks have still not returned to their pre-spill value, ‘partly due to a lack
of clarity about the scale of the potential damages and penalties the com-
pany may face’ (Chazan & Crooks, 2012). The company has been criticised
for its leaders’ gaffes, but both applauded and critiqued for its use of social
media (Beal, 2010; Shogren, 2011).
Yet, research analysing BP’s central response strategies, leaders’ messag-
ing and communication of remorse (Diers & Donohue, 2011; Diers, Gur-
ien, & Otten, 2011; Diers & Pang, 2011) revealed that during the five-
month 2010 crisis, BP’s central response strategy centred on messages of
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corporate social responsibility (CSR).Specifically, BP emphasised messages
combining self-enhancement, messages to frame the company positively,
accommodation as well as excellence in order to send a message that ‘they
cared and would make it right’. BP’s messaging seemed to be focused on
people rather than investors and the media. BP’s response strategy seems
to be an effort to define itself as a socially responsible company; however,
there have yet to be any significant analyses measuring whether the com-
pany was successful in reconstructing itself as a member of the community.
Hearit and Courthright (2003) argue that ‘the reality of a crisis is socially
constructed through language. . . Thus communication is not something
that occurs by organisations in crises, but rather something that constitutes
the meaning that participants in that crisis come to hold’ (p. 307).
The question for BP, as well as any organisation facing a major trans-
gression, is whether grounding its messaging in a CSR-based strategy is
appropriate  that is whether organisations in crisis can credibly dissemi-
nate their versions of reality. In the last couple of years, considerable
attention has been paid to describing and analysing the response strategies
that organisations deploy (Oles, 2010; Piotrowski & Guyette, 2010; Sam-
kin, Allen, & Wallace, 2010, p. 927; Seeger & Griffin-Padgett, 2010; Sung-
Un, Minjeong, & Johnson, 2010; Weber, Erickson, & Stone, 2011); how-
ever, scant attention has been paid to measuring stakeholder evaluations
of those crisis response strategies. In fact, there have been only a handful
of studies analysing stakeholder evaluations of crises. For example, Claeys,
Cauberghe, and Vyncke’s (2010) experiment applying Coombs (2007) situ-
ational crisis communication theory (SCCT) found that the type and sever-
ity of the crisis along with a person’s locus of control influenced
organisational image and strategy preference. This research focused on a
limited variety of response strategies, as SCCT fails to consider the effec-
tiveness of an organisation’s efforts to use crisis response as a tool to
socially construct both the organisation and crisis for stakeholders.
Another example of a recent study analysing stakeholder evaluations of
crises is Piotrowski and Guyette’s (2010) analysis of the Toyota recall
focusing on stakeholder evaluations and recall of leadership, brand loyalty
and ethics. These findings provide important information about Toyota’s
ineffectiveness in managing their crisis but are not theoretically grounded;
it is exploratory. Thus, while issues related to corporate irresponsibility
have been analysed, there remains no benchmark for CSR messaging as an
effective tool to socially construct a crisis.
The dearth of research on the effectiveness of CSR messaging comes at
a time when organisations are moving towards ‘socially responsible’
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messaging as a cornerstone of their routine and crisis messaging strategies
(Tengblad & Ohlsson, 2010; Uccello, 2009). Theoretical analyses posit that
consumers will more positively evaluate companies engaging in socially
responsible activities because the company is viewed as having higher
moral standards (Kreng & May-Yao, 2011). Yet, these changes in gover-
nance that promote social and/or ecological sustainability must also be
rewarded by financial markets, benchmarked, audited and subject to pub-
lic scrutiny (Frankental, 2001). One of the few studies directly examining
the efficacy of a CSR strategy studies in recent years found a significant
relationship between CSR messaging and public intentions to engage in
dialogue with the company (Hong, Yang, & Rim, 2010). These findings
suggest that CSR messages positively influenced corporate image, both
increasing stakeholder intentions to interact and their identification with
the company. Hong et al.’s (2010) findings also reveal a positive relation-
ship between stakeholder identification and behavioural feedback inten-
tions  that is their intent to continue interacting with the company.
The oil industry is one of the few industries where research on the
influence of CSR on corporate policy has been conducted. For example,
Frynas (2005) found that oil companies are paying increased attention to
the social and environmental implications of their work, are engaging
more effectively with local companies and seem to support integrating
CSR into their business models by making organisational changes. In
particular, BP is keenly aware of the relationship between being per-
ceived as socially responsible and their reputation, causing them to
actively incorporate CSR activities into their business strategy (Anderson
& Bieniaszewska, 2005). This is why the BP case represents an important
benchmark for measuring the effectiveness of a company’s social con-
struction efforts after a major transgression  BP is an industry facing
increasing pressure for socially responsible corporate behaviour, it is a
company that has embraced CSR as a corporate strategy and it is a
company that fully deployed the strategy in response to the 2010 spill in
the Gulf of Mexico.
RELATIONAL MODEL OF CORPORATE IMAGE
ASSESSMENT
The present study examines antecedents of BP’s image one year after the
crisis in order to assess whether BP was successful in using its language of
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social responsibility to construct a more positive image after the 2010 spill.
The study is grounded by a relational approach to evaluating corporate
image first articulated by Haley (1996) after analysing consumer under-
standing of advocacy advertising. Haley described advocacy advertising as
image advertising focusing on corporations taking ‘appropriate stands on
key issues’ (p. 19) and found that three core relationships described effec-
tive and ineffective advocacy messages (see Fig. 1): (1) the relationship
between organisations and stakeholders emphasising common values and a
positive image; (2) the relationship between organisations and issues focus-
ing on stakeholder evaluations of the company’s positive intent and capa-
bilities on the issue and (3) the relationship between stakeholders and the
issue itself recognising that issues must be important and actionable to sta-
keholders if advocacy messages are likely to be effective. The model aligns
with previous research establishing that stakeholder characteristics (e.g.
Clayes et al., 2010), public pressure from interested stakeholders in the face
of corporate irresponsibility (e.g. Piotrowski & Guyette, 2010; Uccello,
2009) and engagement (e.g. Hong et al., 2010) are all likely to influence
stakeholder evaluations and behavioural intentions towards organisations.
As a benchmark case, BP’s effort to define itself and its efforts after the
2010 spill in the Gulf of Mexico represents an important opportunity to
evaluate factors that could influence whether a corporate strategy centred
on CSR messaging after significant threat to that strategy’s authenticity
does affect public stakeholders views of the company and issues. Simply
Key Predictors:
• Organization reputation
• Stakeholder knowledge of 
   organization
• Value Congruence 
Issue Stakeholders
Organizations
Key Predictors:
• Investment in issue
• Relevance of issue to self, 
   society
• Belief their actions can 
   help  
Key Predictors:
 • Association between 
    organization & issue
• Expertise to address issue
• Concern about issue
• Positive intent 
Fig.1. Relational Model of Stakeholder Evaluation of Advocacy Messages.
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stated, BP has recognised and implemented CSR as an important compo-
nent of their corporate strategy since at least 2005 (Anderson & Bienias-
zewska, 2005) and that CSR approach was fully deployed in a multimedia
response to the 2010 disaster that threatened the company (Diers & Dono-
hue, 2011). Now, the questions remain  Is a CSR strategy effective when
responding to a major crisis and for whom is the strategy most effective?
To that end, I propose the following research questions based on the rela-
tional model of corporate image assessment:
Research Question 1: To what extent does the relationship between BP
and the spill influence the relationship between stakeholders and BP?
Research Question 2: To what extent do stakeholder characteristics,
investment with the Gulf spill, relevance of the Gulf spill and perceived
ability to affect BP’s actions influence the relationship between stake-
holders and BP?
Research Question 3: To what extent do stakeholder characteristics,
investment with the Gulf spill, relevance of the Gulf spill and perceived
ability to affect BP’s actions influence stakeholders’ behavioural intent
towards BP?
METHODS
The present study triangulates findings by analysing stakeholder engage-
ment on BP’s Facebook page (N=1,515) as well as an image survey of BP
(N=749). The Facebook messages were coded based on a random selec-
tion of the 9th of the month for May, June, July, August and September
2011 and coding all of BP’s and member posts for those days. Approxi-
mately 45 people enrolled in an undergraduate advanced methods course
were trained for one hour, given a codebook and a portion of the sample
to independently code as part of a class project. Ten percent of the sample
was coded by an independent coder and project leader to establish the reli-
ability of the coding (α=0.81).
A convenience sample of participants was recruited via email by the
same undergraduate advanced methods course. Prospective participants
were given a link and asked to complete an anonymous online question-
naire. As a result, the sample had a relatively even distribution of men
(42%) and women (58%), respondents ranging from 18 and 86 years old
with a mean age of approximately 35 years old, were predominantly white
(87%) and largely from the northeastern United States (80%).
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Variable Operationalisation
To operationalise the relationship between the organisation, spill and sta-
keholders using Facebook data, coders evaluated each Facebook member
posts based on two personal interests communicated and two evaluations
of BP. Member posts were analysed to look for a communication of per-
sonal interest in the Gulf coast  that is whether the member shared infor-
mation like whether they lived, worked, vacationed, knew people in the
region or felt so strongly about the issue that they seemed like they could
be an activist. The other personal interest identified was their level of envi-
ronmental interest based on their communication of the importance of
environmental protection or issues. Each of these assessments was based
on a rating from 1 to 7 (very low to very high). If the comment was unre-
lated to the variable, that was also noted.
In evaluating Facebook member attitudes towards BP, two other vari-
ables were coded on a 17 scale ranging from very negative to very posi-
tive. First, BP’s image was coded based on the tone and content of the
message about the company. Second, BP’s connection to the Gulf coast
was evaluated based on identification of assertions about whether BP cares
about the Gulf coast, recovery and/or the spill. As with the personal inter-
ests, if the comment was unrelated that was also noted.
Using Haley’s (1996) conceptualisation of advocacy advertising as the
basis for assessing the key recovery relationships after a crisis, the survey
analysed the influence of stakeholder characteristics, investment in the
spill, relevance of the issue, and assessment of whether BP’s actions can be
influenced on measures of the relationships between organisation and issue
as well as stakeholders and the organisation. Since this study includes new
measures and operationalisations based on Haley’s findings, Table 1 sum-
marises the operationalisation of variables in this study. Exploratory prin-
cipal components factor analyses with Varimax rotation were used to
evaluate relevant items for each of the types of relationships tested. Emer-
gent factors were then evaluated using Chronbeck’s alpha for scale
reliability.
Stakeholder characteristics were operationalised in three ways: age, gen-
der and political identity. Age and gender were included both because
there was a significant correlation between gender and environmental
interest in the Facebook data (r=2 0.06; p, 0.05). Political identity (i.e.
conservativism vs. liberalism) was included because identity and the socio-
political context has previously been identified as important influencers for
organisational discourse (Finet, 2001; Mumby, 2001; Uccello, 2009).
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Stakeholders’ relationship between themselves and the spill was mod-
elled after Haley’s (1996) findings that the importance of the issue to them-
selves and society as well as stakeholder beliefs that their actions can help
are key determinants of that relationship. It was assessed based on evalua-
tions of the stakeholder investment, spill’s relevance and ability to influ-
ence the crisis. These variables were assessed with 15 items and a total of
four subscales.
Finally, the antecedents’ influence was measured against stakeholder
behavioural intentions towards BP. Although Haley’s (1996) evaluation of
the relationship between organisations and stakeholders focused on identi-
fying the reputation, knowledge and value congruence of the organisation
and stakeholders as important factors, these can be easily conceptually
confused with stakeholder assessments of the company’s relationship to the
issue; therefore, as more direct measures of stakeholder assessments of rep-
utation, their behavioural intent was evaluated. In campaign and persua-
sion research, behavioural intent is used as an important indicator of the
effectiveness of a campaign’s effectiveness (Yang, Liu, & Zhou, 2012).
Because my goal is to evaluate the effectiveness of BP’s CSR-based strat-
egy, behavioural intent towards the company is a more direct measure of
the relationship between stakeholders and BP. Intent was evaluated with
two single-item measures of directly working to avoid buying gas at BP
stations and more generally boycotting BP. Additionally, intent was mea-
sured in terms of stakeholders’ willingness to advocate against BP.
Analysis Methods
In order to evaluate each of the research questions, correlations and hierar-
chical regression analyses were used. First, a correlation analysis was per-
formed in order to identify relationships between variables. Second,
hierarchical multiple regression were performed to test the relationships.
Collinearity tests revealed no significant multicollinearity problems.
RESULTS
Broadly, these results demonstrate that a relational approach to evaluating
CSR is a useful theoretical model indicating that relationships between sta-
keholders, issues and organisations are likely to influence the effectiveness
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of an organisation’s CSR messaging (see Table 2). More directly, these
results suggest that while negative evaluations of BP were not particularly
high one year after the 2010 spill in the Gulf of Mexico, BP has not yet
persuaded stakeholders that it is a company that values CSR.
Influence of the Issue
Research questions one and two focused on the influence of the issue after
a crisis, which is a moment of corporate irresponsibility. Findings for
research question one (see Table 3) indicate that the more likely that BP
was perceived as caring about the spill in the Gulf, the higher BP’s image
was among Facebook users interacting on BP’s Facebook page t (647)
=30.82; adjusted R2=0.59.
Findings for research question two (see Tables 47) indicate that stake-
holder characteristics, the relationship between stakeholders and the spill,
and their perceived ability to influence BP’s actions all consistently influ-
ence evaluations of the relationship between BP and the spill itself.
Together, these findings indicate that political identity and investment are
the two variables with the greatest overall influence on this relationship.
Influence of stakeholder’s relationship to the issue on perceptions that
BP’s intentions in the Gulf are corrupt. Overall, while stakeholders’ assess-
ment of BP is slightly positive (M=3.84), stakeholder characteristics, their
investment, the relevance of the spill and the perceived ability to influence
BP’s actions predict approximately 10% of the variance in the relationship
(see Table 4).
Stakeholder characteristics exercised the greatest influence on this mea-
sure. These data suggest that younger stakeholders are more likely to view
BP as corrupt (adjusted R2=0.04) and that the more conservative the
stakeholder, the more likely to view BP as corrupt (adjusted R2=0.04).
Personal investment with the issue and its relevance each predicted about
1% of the variance. The greater the investment, the more likely respon-
dents were to believe BP was corrupt. Similarly, the more personally rele-
vant the spill was, the more likely BP was evaluated as corrupt, though in
the final model, personal relevance was not significant. Finally, the more
that stakeholders believed the USFG AU:1could influence BP’s actions, the
greater the perception that BP was corrupt (adjusted R2=0.01).
Influence of stakeholder’s relationship to the issue on perceptions that
BP’s intentions in the Gulf are self-serving. Overall, while assessments of BP
suggest a moderate belief that BP is self-serving (M=4.40), stakeholder
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characteristics, their investment, the spill’s relevance and the perceived
ability to influence BP’s actions predict approximately 11% of the variance
in the relationship (see Table 5).
Stakeholder characteristics (adjusted R2=0.05) and investment
(adjusted R2=0.04) were the most powerful predictors of this perception.
These data suggest that men were more likely to view BP as being self-
serving with clean-up efforts. Further, conservatives were more likely to
view BP’s efforts as self-serving. The greater the personal investment in the
issue, the more stakeholders believed BP’s efforts were self-serving. While
the relevance of the spill to respondents and Americans were significant
when first introduced into the regression model, in the final model, they
were not. Finally, the perceived ability of the USFG to positively influence
BP’s actions lead to conclusions that BP’s actions were self-serving
(adjusted R2=0.01).
Influence of stakeholder’s relationship to the issue on perceptions that
BP’s intentions in the Gulf are rooted in an ethic of CSR. Overall, while not
a strong negative feeling, respondents do not believe BP’s actions are
grounded by CSR (M=3.31). Political identity (adjusted R2=0.09) and the
perception that the USFG has positively influenced BP’s actions (adjusted
R2=0.01) most influenced respondents’ perceptions (see Table 6, adjusted
R2=0.11).
Though personal investment in the Gulf issue and the perceived rele-
vance of the spill to Americans were significant when introduced into the
model initially, once the perceived ability of the USFG to affect BP’s
actions positive was introduced, they were no longer influential. These data
Table 3. Correlations for Facebook.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1. Gender 
n=1,482
2. Personal investment in Gulf 2 0.01 
n=1,390 n=1,411
3. Environmental interest 2 0.06* 0.64** 
n=1,384 n=1,397
4. Image of BP 2 0.02 2 0.04 2 0.05 
n=717 n=703 n=707
5. BP cares about the Gulf 0.02 0.00 2 0.07 0.77** 
n=677 n=672 n=673 n=649
N=1,515; *significant at the 0.05 level; **significant at the 0.01 level.
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suggest that liberals were more likely to view BP’s actions as being rooted
in an ethic of CSR; further, the greater that the perception the USFG
affected BP, the more that respondents believed BP’s actions were rooted
in CSR.
Influence of stakeholder’s relationship to the issue on perceptions that BP
is committed to clean-up. Overall, while not a strong negative feeling,
respondents do not believe BP is committed to clean-up in the Gulf of
Mexico (M=3.68). Political identity, investment in the Gulf, the spill’s rel-
evance to Americans and the ability to influence BP’s actions predict
approximately 7% of the variance (see Table 7).
Liberals were more likely to view BP as being committed to clean-up
(adjusted R2=0.05). The more that respondents believed the spill was rele-
vant to Americans, the more likely BP was perceived as being committed
to clean-up. Finally, the more the USFG was perceived as able to influence
BP, the more that BP was evaluated as committed to clean-up.
Behavioural Intent towards BP
Research question three evaluated three measures of behavioural intent
regarding BP: stakeholders’ intent to avoid buying gas from BP stations,
their intent to boycott BP more generally and their intent to advocate
against BP. These findings suggest that stakeholder characteristics, invest-
ment with the issue, relevance of the issue and perceived ability to affect
BP were all significant predictors.
Influence of stakeholder’s relationship to the issue on their intent to avoid
buying gas from BP stations. Overall, respondents indicated they were
moderately planning to avoid buying gas from BP (M=4.66, adjusted
R2=0.10). Stakeholder characteristics, investment in the Gulf issue and
perceived personal relevance of the spill all influenced behavioural intent
(see Table 8).
All three measures of stakeholder characteristics significantly influenced
this variable (adjusted R2=0.05). Male, older and liberal respondents were
all more likely to be willing to avoid BP stations. However, the more
invested the respondent was in the issue, the less likely they were to avoid
using BP gas stations (adjusted R2=0.04). There was a similar negative
relationship between the personal relevance of the spill and intent to avoid
BP gas stations. The perceived ability to affect BP’s actions was not a sig-
nificant predictor.
192 AUDRA R. DIERS
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
T
a
b
le
6
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
M
o
d
el
fo
r
B
P
’s
A
ct
io
n
s
R
o
o
te
d
in
C
S
R
M
ea
su
re
.
R
eg
re
ss
o
r
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
1
t
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
2
t
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
3
t
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
4
t
S
E
S
E
S
E
S
E
In
te
rc
ep
t
0
.1
3
3
3
.1
4
0
.1
6
2
7
.0
7
0
.2
1
1
8
.9
8
.2
2
1
6
.8
3
C
o
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
is
m
2
0
.3
0
0
.0
4
2
8
.6
4
*
*
*
2
0
.3
0
0
.0
4
2
8
.6
9
*
*
*
2
0
.3
0
0
.0
4
2
8
.7
6
*
*
*
2
0
.3
0
.0
4
2
8
.8
3
*
*
*
In
v
es
tm
en
t
0
.0
8
0
.0
3
2
.2
0
*
0
.0
7
0
.0
3
2
.0
0
*
0
.0
6
.0
3
1
.6
4
S
p
il
l
re
le
v
a
n
ce
:
A
m
er
ic
a
n
s
0
.0
8
0
.0
3
2
.1
9
*
0
.0
4
.0
3
1
.0
3
R
es
p
o
n
se
ef
fi
ca
cy
:
P
er
so
n
a
l
0
.0
6
.0
3
1
.6
4
R
es
p
o
n
se
ef
fi
ca
cy
:
U
S
F
G
0
.0
9
.0
2
2
.6
0
*
*
F
7
4
.6
8
*
*
*
3
9
.9
4
*
*
*
2
8
.3
6
*
*
*
1
9
.3
4
*
*
*
Δ
F
4
.8
3
4
.8
2
5
.3
5
R
2
0
.0
9
0
.0
9
0
.1
0
0
.1
1
R
2
a
d
j.
0
.0
9
0
.0
9
0
.1
0
0
.1
1
R
2
ch
a
n
g
e
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
d
f
1
,7
8
0
1
,7
7
9
1
,7
7
8
2
,7
7
6
*
p
,
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
,
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
,
0
.0
0
1
.
193Reconstructing Stakeholder Relationships Using ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
T
a
b
le
7
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
M
o
d
el
fo
r
B
P
C
o
m
m
it
te
d
to
C
le
a
n
-U
p
M
ea
su
re
.
R
eg
re
ss
o
r
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
1
t
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
2
t
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
3
t
S
E
S
E
S
E
In
te
rc
ep
t
0
.1
5
3
0
.7
0
0
.2
2
1
8
.4
5
*
*
*
0
.2
4
1
6
.1
6
C
o
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
is
m
2
0
.2
3
0
.0
4
2
6
.6
1
*
*
*
2
0
.2
3
0
.0
4
2
6
.7
5
*
*
*
2
0
.2
3
0
.0
4
2
6
.7
7
*
*
*
S
p
il
l
re
le
v
a
n
ce
:
A
m
er
ic
a
n
s
0
.1
2
0
.0
3
3
.4
8
*
*
*
0
.1
0
0
.0
3
2
.5
6
*
*
R
es
p
o
n
se
ef
fi
ca
cy
:
P
er
so
n
a
l
0
.0
3
0
.0
3
0
.8
4
R
es
p
o
n
se
ef
fi
ca
cy
:
U
S
F
G
0
.0
7
0
.0
3
2
.0
6
*
F
4
3
.7
4
*
*
*
2
8
.2
2
*
*
*
1
5
.5
4
*
*
*
Δ
F
1
2
.0
8
2
.7
4
R
2
0
.0
5
0
.0
7
0
.0
7
R
2
a
d
j.
0
.0
5
0
.0
7
0
.0
7
R
2
ch
a
n
g
e
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
d
f
1
,7
8
0
1
,7
7
9
2
,7
7
7
*
p
,
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
,
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
,
0
.0
0
1
.
194 AUDRA R. DIERS
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
T
a
b
le
8
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
M
o
d
el
fo
r
B
eh
a
v
io
u
ra
l
In
te
n
t:
A
v
o
id
B
u
y
in
g
G
a
s
fr
o
m
B
P
S
ta
ti
o
n
s.
R
eg
re
ss
o
r
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
1
t
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
2
t
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
3
t
B
et
a
M
o
d
el
4
t
S
E
S
E
S
E
S
E
In
te
rc
ep
t
0
.3
0
1
6
.5
9
0
.3
7
1
6
.3
8
0
.4
0
1
7
.6
9
.4
0
1
8
.2
2
G
en
d
er
2
0
.1
0
0
.1
6
2
2
.8
6
*
*
2
.0
9
0
.1
5
2
2
.5
9
*
*
2
0
.1
3
0
.1
5
2
3
.7
8
*
*
*
2
0
.1
1
.1
5
2
3
.0
8
*
*
A
g
e
0
.1
0
0
.0
1
2
.7
9
*
*
0
.0
8
0
.0
1
2
.3
6
*
0
.1
0
0
.0
1
2
.9
2
*
*
0
.1
2
.0
1
3
.4
2
*
*
*
C
o
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
is
m
2
0
.1
8
0
.0
7
2
5
.0
7
*
*
*
2
0
.1
7
0
.0
6
2
4
.9
9
*
*
*
2
0
.1
6
.0
6
2
4
.6
8
*
*
*
In
v
es
tm
en
t
2
0
.2
1
0
.0
5
2
6
.0
2
*
*
*
2
0
.1
8
.0
5
2
5
.2
2
*
*
*
S
p
il
l
re
le
v
a
n
ce
:
P
er
so
n
a
l
2
0
.1
4
.0
4
2
3
.8
4
*
*
*
F
7
.4
3
*
*
*
1
3
.6
8
*
*
*
1
9
.7
9
*
*
*
1
9
.0
6
*
*
*
Δ
F
2
5
.7
2
3
6
.2
6
1
4
.7
4
R
2
0
.0
2
0
.0
5
0
.0
9
0
.1
1
R
2
a
d
j.
0
.0
2
0
.0
5
0
.0
9
0
.1
0
R
2
ch
a
n
g
e
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
2
d
f
2
,7
8
0
3
,7
8
0
4
,7
8
0
5
,7
8
0
*
p
,
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
,
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
,
0
.0
0
1
.
195Reconstructing Stakeholder Relationships Using ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
Influence of stakeholder’s relationship to the issue on their intent to boy-
cott BP. There was an important conceptual difference for stakeholders
between avoiding buying gas and more generally boycotting BP as identi-
fied in these findings (see Table 9). While the desire to boycott was not
strong (M=4.43, adjusted R2=0.19), the tested antecedents did substan-
tially influence that behavioural intent.
Stakeholder characteristics (adjusted R2=0.09), investment in the spill
(adjusted R2=0.02), perceived personal relevance of the spill (adjusted
R2=0.05) and perceived ability to influence BP’s actions (adjusted
R2=0.03) were the most important predictors for the intent to boycott BP.
In this case, women were more likely to boycott BP. Political identity
accounted for about 7% of the variance on its own with a positive rela-
tionship between conservative identity and the intent to boycott BP. Addi-
tionally, the greater the personal investment with the spill, the more likely
respondents were to support boycotting BP. Third, the greater the personal
relevance of the Gulf spill, the more likely respondents reported being will-
ing to boycott BP. Finally, the greater the perceived USFG influence on
BP, the more likely that respondents were to support boycotting BP.
Influence of stakeholder’s relationship to the issue on their intent to advo-
cate against BP. While respondents indicated a moderately low level of
intent to advocate against BP (M=3.39), stakeholder characteristics,
investment in the spill, relevance of the spill and perceived ability to influ-
ence BP significantly affected respondents’ intent to advocate against BP
predicting over one-fifth of the variance (see Table 10).
These data suggest that all three measures of stakeholder characteristics
influence respondent intentions to advocate against BP one year after the
Gulf spill (adjusted R2=0.08). Women were more likely to report willing-
ness to advocate against BP. Younger respondents were also more likely to
report willingness to advocate against BP. However, the greatest influence
was political identity (adjusted R2=0.07) with conservatives reporting the
greatest willingness to advocate against BP. In addition, the greater level
of personal investment with the spill, the more willingness respondents
reported for advocating against BP (adjusted R2=0.05). Personal relevance
of the spill and the relevance to Americans in general both significantly
influenced willingness to advocate against BP (adjusted R2=0.05); how-
ever, in the final model, relevance to Americans was not significant.
Finally, the belief that BP’s actions could be influenced significantly pre-
dicted whether respondents were willing to advocate against BP (adjusted
R2=0.04) with significant positive relationships for both personal influence
as well as the USFG’s influence.
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DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to use a relational model of impression
management to evaluate two questions: Is a CSR-centred strategy effective
when responding to a major crisis and for whom is it most effective? Aside
from answering these questions, the findings demonstrate that a relational
model of corporate image assessment, grounded in Haley’s (1996) work on
advocacy advertising (see Fig. 1), can effectively predict antecedents and
outcomes associated with organisational advocacy. The model supports
previous crisis research emphasising that crisis response is a contextually
bound phenomenon (Carroll, 2009) and meaningfully develops our theo-
retical knowledge of the relationships between emergent issues (e.g. exam-
ples of corporate (ir)responsibility), organisations and stakeholder
assessments. Applied in this case, the model affords us the opportunity to
better evaluate an organisation’s ability to construct a preferred reality
after a crisis using CSR-based messaging.
CSR Messaging, Limited Social Construction
Does CSR messaging construct a compelling reality after a major crisis?
The answer to this question largely depends on BP’s strategic goals. Pre-
vious research indicated that BP has long viewed CSR as an important
component in their corporate strategy (Anderson & Bieniaszewska,
2005), with analyses of BP’s response to the 2010 Gulf spill conclusively
demonstrating that CSR-based messaging grounded BP’s crisis response
strategy (e.g. Diers & Donohue, 2011). If BP’s goal was to be viewed as
a socially responsible corporation one year after the spill, then these data
suggest that BP’s objective largely failed. The company’s response to the
spill is viewed as being moderately self-serving, moderately unlikely to
be rooted in an ethic of CSR and moderately negatively committed to
clean-up in the Gulf of Mexico. One weakness of this data is that there
is no direct measure of BP’s image in 2010 during or after the spill as a
point of comparison for these findings. Repeating this assessment in the
future could better evaluate if BP’s image has changed and in which
direction.
Similarly, if a goal of CSR messaging is to create good will towards the
company, particularly in the face of a transgression, it also seems like BP
has failed in this respect as well. These data suggest that behavioural intent
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is still negative towards BP as demonstrated by the respondents’ moderate
intent to either avoid buying gas from BP stations or boycott BP more
generally. Because these two actions were predicted by opposite stake-
holder characteristics (i.e. men, older respondents and liberals were more
likely to be willing to avoid buying gas from BP stations and women and
conservatives were more likely to be willing to boycott BP more generally),
we can conclude that most people still view their relationship with BP as a
negative.
Through these conclusions, it is important to note that there are some
seemingly contradictory findings. For example, evaluations that when sta-
keholders perceive the US government as effectively influencing BP’s
actions, BP is viewed as significantly more self-serving paired with the
finding that some stakeholders believe BP’s actions are rooted in an ethic
of CSR or even more clearly the findings that personal relevance of the
issue can have both a positive and negative relationship with stake-
holders’ willingness to boycott BP. Given the strong influences of gender,
age and political identity for each of these findings, I would argue that
these findings demonstrate a limitation in the effectiveness of any
response strategy  identity politics. In the United States, identity politics
is ruling  in fact, Americans are probably more divided along gender,
age and political identification now than at any point in the last three
decades (Debevec, 2012). As such an influential component of the socio-
political environment, it helps to explain these seemingly contradictory
findings and demonstrate a significant limitation for any crisis response
strategy.
The silver lining for BP. There may, however, be a silver lining as we
evaluate BP’s use of CSR as a response strategy. Though the relationships
between BP and the Gulf of Mexico and stakeholders and BP are still gen-
erally negative, these data suggest there are three relatively positive out-
comes for BP one year after the spill. First, the Facebook data have two
important implications. Initially, there are a lot of people engaging BP on
Facebook, confirming Hong et al.’s (2010) analysis that a CSR strategy
can lead to important dialogue between a company and its stakeholders.
Thus, while BP may not have created a new reality on its own, its consis-
tent use of CSR as a messaging strategy seems to have opened the lines of
communication between stakeholders and the company. That dialogue
may lay the groundwork for an increasingly positive relationship between
various stakeholder groups and BP in the future. Further, the analysis of
member comments on Facebook indicates that when members perceive
that BP cares about the spill in the Gulf, it predicts they will view BP more
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positively almost 60% of the time. That direct relationship between the
perception of BP caring and a positive image suggests that when BP suc-
cessfully persuades stakeholders they care, the relationship between the sta-
keholders and the company is going to improve.
The second positive indicator for BP and the utility of CSR as a mes-
sage strategy is that one year after the spill, most respondents did not view
BP as a fundamentally corrupt organisation. Though BP struggles with
particular groups (i.e. younger participants and conservatives), these find-
ings suggest that the negative association with BP is likely less about the
fundamental character of the company and more about the evidence of
their actions. In this way, BP was able to influence stakeholders’ under-
standing of the company’s character. Applying Haley’s (1996) findings,
these data suggest that while the BP’s reputation is still negatively affected,
it is not viewed as having values that are largely incongruous with most
respondents. This suggests that the reputational problem can yet be
addressed.
Finally, whilst stakeholders are still wary of patronising BP, these data
suggest that most respondents were unlikely to be interested in actively
advocating against BP one year after the spill. This, in combination with
the dialogue evident on BP’s Facebook page, is an indication that BP’s
CSR-based response strategy may have minimised the outrage towards BP.
Though these data would indicate this may be true, I am wary about the
causal connection between CSR and the interest in advocating against BP
because of factors not tested in this study. For example, within one year
after the spill, the environmental and economic effects of it seem to have
been minimised. Thus, future research should analyse the influence of ‘pro-
blems solved’ as a mediating factor influencing the relationship between
messaging and willingness to advocate against an organisation that has
been irresponsible.
Overall implications of a CSR strategy. As one of the few direct mea-
sures of the use of CSR, these data suggest that while it may not be a
solution to reputational problems, it may be strategically useful for an
organisation trying to persuade stakeholders that it is a good company
despite the transgression. Repeated measures of the changes in stake-
holders’ attitudes towards a company would substantially validate these
findings. Absent the evaluations of changes in these outcome variables,
these data can only describe the outcomes of BP’s CSR-based response
one year after the end of the Gulf spill. Yet, these cross-sectional data
do suggest that there are reputational and dialogic benefits to this
approach.
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Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of CSR as a Crisis Response Strategy
By applying the relational model of corporate image assessment, we can bet-
ter understand what influences both stakeholder evaluations of the quality
of an organisation’s actions as well as their behavioural intentions towards
the organisation. These data suggest that the stakeholder’s relationship to
the issue and the organisation reveal new information about the effective-
ness of CSR as a crisis response strategy. Equally important, these data tell
a consistent story about who may be most susceptible to a company’s use of
the CSR crisis strategy. Thus, one of the strongest contributions this
research makes is beginning to identify a profile of stakeholder char-
acteristics, values and activism that should be pursued in future research.
Moderator variables. Moderator variables strengthen the direction or
relationship between other independent variables and the dependent vari-
ables. Therefore, because personal investment  that is stakeholders’ inter-
est, information seeking behaviours and perceived knowledge about the
issue  and the relevance of the issue to the stakeholder were consistently
significant regardless of other stakeholder characteristic variables (i.e. they
were significant regardless of the direction of the political identify, gender
or age variables), these two variables are likely moderator variables in
assessing the relationship between organisations, stakeholders and issues.
For example, if we compare the findings from research question two asses-
sing stakeholder intentions to avoid buying gas from BP and the willing-
ness to advocate against BP, we find the exact opposite stakeholder
characteristics predicting these behavioural intentions and similar influence
of investment and relevance. Specifically, older, male and liberal stake-
holders were more willing to avoid buying gas from BP stations where
younger, female and conservative stakeholders were more willing to advo-
cate against BP; yet, on both measures, investment and relevance were sig-
nificant predictors as well.
These findings indicate for those populations interested in taking action
for or against an organisation, investment and perceived relevance only
strengthen those interests AU:2. Yet, in this moderator relationship is an oppor-
tunity for CSR messaging to affect the relationship because information-
seeking behaviour is an essential component to investment. If an organisa-
tion is successful in reaching out to populations depending on their inter-
ests, then they have the opportunity to strengthen or even change the
relationship between the stakeholders and organisation.
Stakeholder profiles. These data also suggest that understanding key
stakeholder characteristics will help organisations reliably predict the
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probability that CSR messaging will be effective. Age and sex are certainly
important demographic considerations for organisations trying to manage
relationships, especially because younger demographics and women are
much more likely to adopt an activist identity against organisations that
have committed a transgression violating the public trust. In particular,
younger demographics are more likely to view multinational corporations
as corrupt organisations indicating CSR strategies may be less effective in
changing the company’s reputation.
However, the most striking finding was for the influence of political
identity on assessments of BP’s image and stakeholder behavioural inten-
tions towards the company. The central arguments that BP made in
their CSR messaging during the Gulf spill and in the year after were
that they cared about the Gulf and its people (i.e. they had adopted an
ethic of CSR) and were committed to fully restoring the Gulf. These
data clearly suggest that liberals were more likely to view BP as adopt-
ing a CSR ethic and being committed to clean-up, suggesting that the
messaging strategy was significantly more successful among liberals.
Conversely, conservatives consistently evaluated BP more negatively. The
negative evaluations seemed to be amplified with the perceived influence
of the USFG on BP’s actions. That is, for conservatives who were
already inclined to evaluate BP negatively, when these respondents per-
ceived BP as being swayed by the federal government’s demands on the
company, they evaluated BP even more negatively. For those who have
followed American politics in the last several years, these findings are
not surprising because they support a dominant theme communicated in
the American conservative media  that taking money away from stock-
holders and cooperating with the democratic president are fundamental
violations of ‘conservative’ values in the United States. These findings
suggest that political dogmatism may make some stakeholders more sus-
ceptible to CSR messaging, likewise others less susceptible to CSR mes-
saging. Future research should validate these conclusions with different
organisations and contexts.
CONCLUSIONS
There are two major contributions that this piece makes examining the
effectiveness of the CSR strategy as a tool of crisis social construction after
a major transgression. First, these data suggest that while strategies centred
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on social/environmental responsibility are not a panacea for transgressors,
the CSR strategy is likely to improve dialogue between stakeholders and
the organisation and separate evaluations of the transgression from the
fundamental character of the organisation. These outcomes will likely help
organisations move forward from irresponsible actions. Yet, organisations
must create realistic objectives if they use CSR messaging as an integral
part of their crisis response.
Second, the BP case confirms the utility of the relational model of image
assessment to evaluate the effectiveness of CSR strategies. In so doing,
these data reveal four important conclusions that should not only help
develop future research but organisations to better apply CSR messaging
to appropriate stakeholder groups. Initially, these data contributed to the
conceptualisation of the relational model of image assessment by focusing
on behavioural intentions as a key indicator of the relationship between
stakeholders and the organisation. By doing so, it more effectively concep-
tually separates this relationship from reputational assessments of the
organisation’s actions. Second, these findings indicate that stakeholder
characteristics are critical determinants of the relationships between stake-
holders, organisations and emergent issues. Future research should focus
on creating a more comprehensive typology of stakeholder characteristics
that increase susceptibility to CSR messaging. Third, in line with Haley’s
(1996) arguments, perceived value congruence between stakeholders and
organisations is an essential variable to evaluate the effectiveness of CSR
messaging. This study only assessed political identity; however, that was
the most consistently powerful predictor of respondent perceptions of BP.
Future research needs to continue to identify important value congruence
variables. Finally, the present research demonstrates the centrality of the
issue itself in understanding the outcomes of CSR messaging strategies.
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